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Scott Lyon
298 Posts |
Posted - 04/30/2003 : 10:27:04 AM
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In an effort to assist our understanding of the ambiguous "intent to defraud" language, I offer the following:
Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition - defraud, vb. To cause injury or loss to (a person) by deceit. See FRAUD. - deceit, n. 1. The act of intentionally giving a false impression. 2. A tort arising from a false representation made knowingly or recklessly with the intent that another person should detrimentally rely on it. 3. See FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION
Dickson v. State, 61 S.W.2d 661 (Tenn. 1933) "The fourth assignment is that the trial judge was in error in failing to define, in his charge to the jury, the meaning of the intent to defraud which is essential to the commission of the offense of making false entries. The statute does not define or limit the phrase, and we doubt whether a definition could be given which would clarify its meaning, without improperly limiting its scope. It is easier to apply a rule requiring proof of fraudulent intent than to define it. We have ruled herein that the intention to conceal previous peculations from the employer was an intent to defraud, in the making of the entry in issue."
There you have it. I don't think I could say it any better than the Tennessee Supreme Court. |
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utman
244 Posts |
Posted - 04/30/2003 : 11:28:39 AM
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Man, that's pure gold!
Thanks Scott... |
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SKozicki
243 Posts |
Posted - 04/30/2003 : 12:49:25 PM
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This is great stuff, and definitely helps us seem like we know what we're talking about when someone says "what about intent to defraud?"
However, the legal definition raises some interesting issues. It is inherent in encryption and cryptography that you are generating a 'false impression'. NATs and firewalls would also fall under this category, because you are essentially 'deceiving' the outside world as to what you are concealing on the inside. With that beach head, it might be easier to then say that you are causing injury or loss (particularly of revenue) to a service provider. This is certainly a sticky area.
The Surpreme Court decision is only marginally helpful to us though, in that they're basically saying that SPs must show PROOF that you intentionally meant to injure them and steal. This is what they're hoping will get the bills over the hump by adding the amendmants. Considering the injunction language and the repositioning of burden of proof in the rest of the bill, we're still a WAYS away from making this even close to appropriate. But I don't know what a snappy retort is to 'what about intent to defraud?'
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Scott Lyon
298 Posts |
Posted - 04/30/2003 : 11:07:33 PM
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The snappy retort is "The amendment doesn't really heighten the mens rae (pronouned "Mens Ray-ah"). The requisite mens rae is inferred by mere possession, which has no mental state requirement (see Section (f))."
The mens rae is the mental state required to prove an element of a crime (i.e. intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, negligently). While in theory the amendment creates a relatively high mens rae standard of proof, it's defeated by the relatively low thresholds in the inference section. Possession (Section (f)(3)) creates a strict liability standard of sorts, which requires no proof of a specific mental state. All the prosecution would have to show is that you were in possession of "unlawful communications devices" or that you had them connected. The burden then shifts to the defendant to either refute connection or possession (probably difficult), or produce evidence rebutting the inference of "intent to defraud." The prosecution would then get a chance to rebut your rebuttal. One problem we have is that the "intent to defraud" is so vague and impossible to define, it could apply in a lot of inappropriate ways. If, for example, Comcast required you to purchase a Comcast-approved router, but you built your own and connected it without written permission, an argument could be made that you acted willfully and intentionally without permission from Comcast to attach a non-approved device for the purpose of cheating Comcast out of a "legitimate" sale of their approved router. This sounds incredible and anticompetitive, but is the natural interpretation of the language of the bill. |
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Scott Lyon
298 Posts |
Posted - 04/30/2003 : 11:32:51 PM
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Also, for a good laugh, take a look at Section (d)(3)....
The communication service providers have left the door open in case somebody wanted to try to use their own law against them. They get the nice, high "intent to defraud" and "acting knowingly" standard, but no "inference" burdens. They wanted to exempt themselves, but don't want anybody else claiming to be a "communication service provider" and thus exempt under the statute. If only the rest of us had the same protection they have provided for themselves. |
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